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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Mace L. St. Clair appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence obtained in a search of his vehicle after an officer conducted a traffic stop because
snow had accumulated on St. Clair’s license plate. On appeal, St. Clair argues that the
district court erred in finding that snow obstructing a license plate is a violation of I.C.
§ 49-428, which requires that license plates “be maintained free from foreign materials and
in a condition to be clearly legible.”

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On December 15, 2016, Sergeant Ken Yount of the Idaho State Police was
patrolling in Nez Perce County. (Tr., p.8, L.25 – p.9, L.5; p.11, Ls.8-13. 1) It had been
snowing and “there was quite a bit of snow accumulation on the highway.” (Tr., p.11, L.17
– p.12, L.2.) By 11:00 a.m., “it had warmed up a little bit, and the snowplows had kind of
caught up with the maintenance of the highway. So it was wet, partly snow pack and
slushy.” (Id.)
Around 11:04 a.m., Sergeant Yount noticed a silver Honda Civic traveling in front
of his patrol car. (Tr., p.12, L.19 – p.13, L.13.) “[T]he majority of the rear windshield
appeared to be covered in snow.” (Id.) When Sergeant Yount positioned his patrol car to
initiate a traffic stop, he “noticed that the rear of the vehicle, including the rear license
plate, was also covered in snow.” (Id.) He then initiated a traffic stop. (Id.) The driver of
the silver Honda Civic identified himself as Mace L. St. Clair. (Tr., p.21, Ls.16-24.)

1

All “Tr.” references are to the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress, held on
April 20, 2017.
1

For purposes of the motion to suppress, the parties stipulated that, after Sergeant
Yount initiated the traffic stop, he “ran Mr. St. Clair’s name through dispatch, and it came
back that he was suspended in two states. Based upon the return, Sergeant Yount did, in
fact, place him under arrest.” (Tr., p.22, Ls.4-22.) “[D]uring the search incident to that
arrest, a baggy of what was presumed to be methamphetamine was located on Mr. St.
Clair’s person.”
methamphetamine.”

(Id.)
(Id.)

“A lab test was returned, and it did come back with
The state charged St. Clair with felony possession of a

controlled substance. (R., pp.9-10, 39.)
St. Clair moved to suppress the drug evidence on the basis that Sergeant Yount’s
traffic stop violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article
1 § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.59-60.) At the hearing on the motion to suppress,
the state argued that Sergeant Yount had two justifications to initiate a traffic stop: (1) the
snow covering St. Clair’s back windshield obstructed his view in violation of I.C. § 49612(3), which prohibits operating a vehicle “when the windshield and/or windows of the
vehicle are coated with ice, snow, sleet, or dust to the extent that the driver’s view ahead,
or to the sides or rear of the vehicle are obstructed” and (2) the snow covering St. Clair’s
license plate violated I.C. § 49-428(2), which requires that license plates “be maintained
free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible.” (Tr., p.34, L.2 – p.41,
L.5.)
The district court rejected the state’s first justification but denied the motion to
suppress based on the second justification. (R., pp.68-73.) Specifically, the district court
found, “[b]ased upon the review of the video and photos submitted,” that “[b]oth the rear
view mirror and the side mirrors of the car were not obstructed by snow,” which meant

2

“the driver’s view of the rear was not obstructed.” (R., p.71.) The district court also found
“that the license plate was obstructed by the snow accumulation.” (Id.) The district court
concluded that “this obstruction . . . gave rise to reasonable and articulable suspicion that
the vehicle was being driven contrary to traffic laws” because “I.C. § 49-428(2) requires
that a license plate be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly
legible.” (Id.) St. Clair filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider its ruling. (R.,
pp.75-78.) The district court denied the motion. (R., pp.79-84.)
St. Clair entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.88-89.) The district court withheld
judgment, placed St. Clair on probation for four years, and stayed the sentence pending this
appeal. (R., p.99.) St. Clair timely appealed. (R., pp.102-05.)

3

ISSUE
St. Clair states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. St. Clair’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p.5)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has St. Clair failed to show that the district court erred when it denied St. Clair’s
motion to suppress drug evidence based on its conclusion that snow obstructing a license
plate is a violation of I.C. § 49-428(2), which requires that license plates “be maintained
free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible”?

4

ARGUMENT
St. Clair Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His
Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court properly denied St. Clair’s motion to suppress. St. Clair does not

challenge the district court’s findings that snow made his license plate not visible or that
Sergeant Yount could not read the license plate because of the snow. Instead, his sole
argument on appeal is that Sergeant Yount did not have reasonable suspicion that St. Clair
had violated the law because, in St. Clair’s view, driving with a snow-covered, illegible
license plate is never a violation of Idaho law. That is wrong.
Under the plain language of I.C. § 49-428(2), license plates “shall be maintained
free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible.” The statute makes no
mention of any exceptions—let alone the specific exception that St. Clair asks this Court
to read into the statute for snow and inclement weather. In light of the plain meaning of
the statute, the district court did not err when it found St. Clair’s snow-covered, illegible
license plate gave Sergeant Yount reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop without
violating the Fourth Amendment.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho appellate courts review a district court’s order resolving a motion to suppress

“using a bifurcated standard of review.” State v. Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 404, 374 P.3d
563, 567 (2016). “This Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, but may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in
light of those facts.”

Id.

In addition, “[t]his Court exercises free review over the
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interpretation of a statute.” State v. Tollman, 162 Idaho 798, ___, 405 P.3d 583, 586
(2017).

C.

The District Court Did Not Err In Denying St. Clair’s Motion To Suppress Because
Snow Obstructing A License Plate Is A Violation Of I.C. § 49-428(2)
The district court properly concluded that Sergeant Yount’s traffic stop of St. Clair

did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 2 “The seizure of a vehicle’s occupants in order to
investigate a traffic violation is a ‘reasonable seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment so long
as the seizing officer had reasonable suspicion that a violation had occurred.” State v.
Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608, 389 P.3d 150, 153 (2016) (citing Rodriguez v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015)). Sergeant Yount’s traffic stop of St. Clair was a reasonable
seizure because the snow obstructing St. Clair’s license plate gave Sergeant Yount
reasonable suspicion that St. Clair had violated I.C. § 49-428(2).
A proper reading of I.C. § 49-428(2) reveals that operating a vehicle with a snowcovered license plate, such that the characters on the license plate cannot be read,
constitutes a traffic violation under Idaho law. “Statutory analysis ‘must begin with the
literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this
Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.’” State v. Neal, 159 Idaho
439, 444, 362 P.3d 514, 519 (2015) (quoting Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011)).

2

Although St. Clair made passing reference to Idaho’s constitution in the district court, he
has not substantively argued on appeal that Idaho’s constitution affords greater protection
than the Fourth Amendment in any way significant to this case. He has thus forfeited that
argument. See State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 513, 236 P.3d 1269, 1273 (2010); State
v. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 131-32, 922 P.2d 426, 428-29 (Ct. App. 1996).
6

The language of I.C. § 49-428(2) is unambiguous. Section 49-428(2) is part of the
statute that governs the display of license plates in Idaho. See I.C. § 49-428. It sets forth
a number of requirements for license plates:
Every license plate shall at all times be securely fastened to the vehicle to
which it is assigned to prevent the plate from swinging, be at a height not
less than twelve (12) inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom of
the plate, be in a place and position to be clearly visible, and shall be
maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly
legible . . . .
I.C. § 49-428(2). The plain language of the statute requires that the license plates “be
maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible.” Id.
(emphasis added).
Sergeant Yount had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop because St. Clair
failed to meet either of those requirements. His license plate was not “free from foreign
materials,” id., “because the plate was covered with snow” (R., p.69). 3 And his license
plate was not “in a condition to be clearly legible,” I.C. § 49-428(2), because the snow
made Sergeant Yount “unable to read the license plate number to dispatch when he stopped
the car” (R., p.82). St. Clair did not dispute that the snow made his license plate illegible

3

Snow is a “foreign material[]” as that phrase is used in the statute. I.C. § 49-428(2).
Neither foreign nor material is defined in the statute, which means each word must be given
its ordinary meaning. See Johnson v. State, 162 Idaho 213, ___, 395 P.3d 1246, 1251
(2017) (“‘In the absence of a statutory definition, the language of a statute should be given
its plain, usual and ordinary meaning.’” (quoting Albee v. Judy, 136 Idaho 226, 231, 31
P.3d 248, 253 (2001)). Foreign means “of, relating to, or proceeding from some other
person or material thing than the one under consideration.” Merriam-Webster Online,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/foreign (last visited March 14, 2018).
Material means “the elements, constituents, or substances of which something is composed
or
can
be
made.”
Merriam-Webster
Online,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/material (last visited March 14, 2018). Snow falls within the scope
of “foreign materials” in the statute because it is composed of elements, constituents, or
substances proceeding from some other material thing than the license plate.
7

in the district court or on appeal. (R., p.82 (“There is no dispute that the license plate was
not visible.”).) And the district court’s findings are supported by the photographs and video
entered as exhibits at the suppression hearing. (See Exhibits 1-4.) Because St. Clair was
undisputedly driving with a snow-covered, illegible license plate, Sergeant Yount had
reasonable suspicion that St. Clair violated I.C. § 49-428(2), which means his traffic stop
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Linze, 161 Idaho at 608, 389 P.3d at 153.
St. Clair argues that he could not have “failed to ‘maintain’ the license plate within
the meaning of the statue” because “the State made no showing that Mr. St. Clair had done,
or failed to do, any act that would or could have kept his license plate in a state of being
snow-free.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) The state does not disagree with St. Clair’s definition
of maintain, 4 but it defeats, rather than supports, his argument. The ordinary meaning of
maintain makes clear that, because St. Clair chose to drive his vehicle in Idaho, he had an
affirmative obligation to keep his license plate “free from foreign materials and in a
condition to be clearly legible.” I.C. § 49-428(2); (accord Appellant’s brief, p.9 (“This
language imposes an affirmative duty . . . .”)). Given this affirmative obligation imposed
by the statute, it is a violation of the statute to drive a vehicle in Idaho with an illegible
license plate regardless of the source or cause of the obstruction. This means that St. Clair
cannot drive his vehicle in Idaho with an illegible license plate and then excuse his violation
of the statute by claiming the accumulation of snow on his license plate, which made the

4

“The ordinary meaning of ‘maintain’ is ‘to keep in an existing state (as in repair,
efficiency, or validity): preserve from failure or decline.’” (Appellant’s brief, p.9 (quoting
Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/maintain (last
visited February 23, 2018)).)

8

characters on his license plate illegible, was not his fault because it was caused by an
external force such as the weather. 5
More to the point, St. Clair’s argument ignores that the district court did not find,
and did not need to find, that St. Clair actually violated the statute. The district court found
“the trooper had reasonable, articulable suspicion that the vehicle was being driven
contrary to traffic laws.” (R., p.82 (emphasis added).) “The quantity and quality of
information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that necessary to
establish probable cause.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210
(2009). And “[a]n officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or
possession to support reasonable suspicion . . . .” State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609,
615, 329 P.3d 391, 397 (Ct. App. 2014). Regardless of whether the state would ultimately
have to show “Mr. St. Clair had done, or failed to do, any act that would have kept his
license plate in a state of being snow-free” to prove a violation of I.C. § 49-428(2)
(Appellant’s brief, p.9), the fact that St. Clair was driving his car in Idaho with a snowcovered, illegible license plate was sufficient to give Sergeant Yount reasonable suspicion
that St. Clair had failed to maintain his license plate in violation of the statute.
St. Clair also proposes his own interpretation of I.C. § 49-428(2), purportedly based
on the “plain meaning” of the statute, but it finds no basis in the statute’s text. He asks this
Court to read into the statute an exception for “precipitation while driving in inclement

5

St. Clair’s suggestion that compliance with the statute would have been “impossible,”
(Appellant’s brief, p.9), is belied by the record. Although it had snowed earlier in the day,
by the time of the traffic stop, “it had warmed up.” (Tr., p.11, L.20 – p.12, L.2.) In fact,
the dash-cam video of the traffic stop shows the snow melting off of the license plate
shortly after Sergeant Yount initiated the stop. (Compare Exhibit 1 at 01:35, with Exhibit
1 at 15:01.) To comply with the statute, St. Clair simply had to clear off his license plate
so that law enforcement could identify his vehicle.
9

weather” (Appellant’s brief, p.10), even though the statute itself says nothing about any
exceptions—let alone an exception for precipitation or inclement weather, see I.C. § 49428(2). That is the antithesis of “plain meaning.” See, e.g., State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326,
328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2008) (describing “plain meaning” as “giv[ing] the words of the
statute their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning” (emphasis added)).
St. Clair attempts to justify reading an exception into the plain language of the
statute by arguing that the result of applying the statute as written would be absurd or
irrational: “[t]o hold otherwise would make it impossible for Idahoans to legally drive their
vehicles in snow storms or other inclement weather.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) Regardless
of whether St. Clair is correct as to the result of applying the statute as written, 6 this Court
has soundly rejected attempts to revise an unambiguous statute on the basis that its
application would have an absurd or irrational result. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 896, 265
P.3d at 509 (“[W]e have never revised or voided an unambiguous statute on the ground
that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as written, and
we do not have the authority to do so.”).
Even assuming that St. Clair’s exception-based reading of the statute could be
found in the plain language, that would not end the analysis because the statute would be

6

The state does not necessarily agree with St. Clair’s prediction. Nor is it necessary for
this Court to decide potential future cases to resolve this appeal. Given that Sergeant Yount
needed only reasonable suspicion that St. Clair violated the statute and given that St. Clair
does not contest that his license plate had so much snow on it that the plate was not visible
and the characters were illegible, the only possible interpretation of the statute that would
favor St. Clair in this appeal would be that snow on a license plate can never be a violation
of I.C. § 49-428. That cannot possibly be the correct interpretation because, as explained
above, it has no basis in the text of the statute and, in fact, directly contradicts the plain
language of the statute that license plates must “be maintained free from foreign materials
and in a condition to be clearly legible.” I.C. § 49-428(2).
10

ambiguous: it could be read both with and without the exception. See Verska, 151 Idaho
at 896, 265 P.3d at 509 (“A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more
than one reasonable construction.”). 7 “[W]hen statutory language is ambiguous, [this
Court] examine[s] the proffered interpretations and consider[s] the ‘context in which the
language is used, the evils to be remedied and the objects in view.’” Neal, 159 Idaho at
447, 362 P.3d at 522 (quoting Callies v. O’Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 847, 216 P.3d 130, 136
(2009)).
The primary evil to be remedied by I.C. § 49-428(2) is illegible license plates,
which make vehicle identification nearly impossible for law enforcement. The state’s
interpretation of the statute proscribes all instances of illegible license plates. St. Clair’s
interpretation does not—as illustrated by the case at hand. (See R., p.82 (“When the trooper
contacted dispatch regarding the stop, he could not provide the numbers on the license plate
because the plate was covered with snow.”).)

Thus, even if I.C. § 49-428(2) were

ambiguous, the state’s interpretation should be adopted because it aligns with the statute’s
purpose, whereas St. Clair’s interpretation frustrates that purpose in any case involving
inclement weather. 8 See Neal, 159 Idaho at 447, 362 P.3d at 522 (adopting interpretation
that more closely aligned with the statute’s purpose); Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125

7

The state’s position, as explained above, is that the statute is unambiguous. St. Clair’s
exception-based reading cannot make the statute ambiguous because reading an exception
into the statute that has no basis in the statute’s text is not a “reasonable construction” of
the statute. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 896, 265 P.3d at 509.
8

Because the state’s interpretation is more faithful to the purpose and legislative intent of
the statute, the rule of lenity would not apply, even if the statute were ambiguous. State v.
Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 441, 313 P.3d 765, 769 (Ct. App. 2013) (“Only then, when there
is an interpretive ‘tie’ between two or more reasonable readings, is a court mandated to
strictly construe the ambiguous statute in favor of the defendant and apply the rule of
lenity.”).
11

Idaho 333, 337, 870 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1994) (adopting interpretation that “is consistent
with the primary purpose” of the statute); see also Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. v.
Gooding Cnty., 159 Idaho 84, 87, 356 P.3d 377, 380 (2015) (“[I]f the statute is ambiguous,
this Court must engage in statutory construction to ascertain legislative intent and give
effect to that intent.”).
In sum, the plain language of I.C. § 49-428(2) requires drivers to keep their license
plates “clearly legible.” St. Clair’s undisputed failure to do so gave Sergeant Yount
“reasonable suspicion that a violation had occurred,” which means he did not violate the
Fourth Amendment when he conducted a traffic stop. Linze, 161 Idaho at 608, 389 P.3d
at 153. This conclusion is not only compelled by the plain language of I.C. § 49-428(2)
but also supported by numerous decisions from other courts in the context of similar
license-plate-display statutes. See, e.g., State v. Haldane, 300 P.3d 657, 664 (Mont. 2013)
(holding no Fourth Amendment violation for officer to conduct traffic stop where “license
plate was obstructed by snow and a trailer hitch” because Montana statute “requires that a
license plate ‘may not be obstructed from plain view’ and must be ‘obviously visible’”);
United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 235, 244 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[B]ecause . . . the officers had
observed that the license plate was covered by snow and road debris, the officers had
probable cause to believe that Wilson had violated [New York law] by driving with an
obstructed license.”); People v. Brooks, 23 A.D. 3d 847, 848-49 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)
(finding “the vehicle’s obscured license plate provided proper cause for a stop” where “the
rear license plate [was] obscured by dirt and snow”); State v. Clark, 394 N.W.2d 570, 572
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding “specific and articulable facts to support a stop of
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respondent’s vehicle” where officer “observed that the rear license plate was ‘obliterated
by snow,’ preventing him from reading the letters and numbers on the license plate”).

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Order Withholding
Judgment And Order Of Probation entered upon St. Clair’s conditional guilty plea to
possession of a controlled substance.
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2018.

/s/ Jeff Nye__________________________
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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